Beck, Asia and second modernity by Calhoun, Craig
  
Craig Calhoun 
Beck, Asia and second modernity 
 
Article (Accepted version) 
(Refereed) 
 
 
 
Original citation: 
Calhoun, Craig (2010) Beck, Asia and second modernity. The British Journal of Sociology, 61 
(3). pp. 597-619. ISSN 0007-1315  
 
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-4446.2010.01328.x 
 
© 2010 London School of Economics and Political Science 
 
This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/42626/ 
 
Available in LSE Research Online: December 2015 
 
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the 
School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual 
authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any 
article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. 
You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities 
or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE 
Research Online website.  
 
This document is the author’s final accepted version of the journal article. There may be 
differences between this version and the published version.  You are advised to consult the 
publisher’s version if you wish to cite from it. 
 
 
 
Beck, Asia, and Second Modernity 
Craig Calhoun 
It is an oddity that discussions of cosmopolitanism are overwhelmingly 
Euro-American. They are about globalization, and about shared risks, 
rights, and responsibilities in an interconnected world, but they reflect 
disproportionately views from the old ‘core’ of the modern world system 
(and Western-educated elites from formerly colonial outposts). This is the 
source of at least four biases.  
First, though an effort is made to include consideration of poor, 
developing, or emerging economies cosmopolitan theories reflect the 
perspective of the rich. Second, though an effort is made to be 
multicultural, cosmopolitan theories are rooted in the West. Third, the 
way in which most cosmopolitan theories try to escape cultural bias is by 
imagining an escape from culture into a realm of the universal (as 
though those who travel aren’t still shaped by their previous cultural 
contexts and as though there the global circuits themselves don’t provide 
new cultural contexts). Fourth, despite attention to social problems, 
because cosmopolitan theories are rooted in the (declining) core of the 
modern world system, they tend to imagine the world as more 
systematically and uniformly interconnected than it is.   
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 Ulrich Beck and his collaborators in this collection of essays (BJS 
2010)  are to be congratulated for a major effort to overcome at least 
some of these biases. In the present response, I begin with appreciation 
for Beck’s recent leadership in efforts to improve cosmopolitan theory, 
and for his and his colleagues’ efforts to adapt and advance this theory in 
application to several East Asian countries. I then offer two arguments 
about ambiguities in the theory of ‘reflexive modernization’ on which this 
project is based and about the attempt to distinguish empirical 
cosmopolitization from normative cosmopolitanism. I conclude by 
returning to an ironic observation I can state up front: these analyses 
elaborate a theory that holds that nation-states are being transcended, 
yet it is organized almost entirely in terms of nation-states. 
 
Appreciation 
As a leading cosmopolitan theorist, Beck has been both innovative 
and influential. Though I refer to him as an individual, it is worth noting 
and appreciating that Beck’s work has often been collaborative, that he 
has nurtured a number of younger colleagues, and that he has built a 
collective research enterprise based in Munich. This is a model, among 
other things, for combining the development of theory and the 
improvement of empirical knowledge with attention to major public 
issues. Most clearly in work on risk, Beck’s group demonstrates that 
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public sociology is not simply a matter of making existing scholarly work 
more easily accessible, but of harnessing serious theory and research to 
the task of understanding pressing collective concerns. We should 
appreciate Beck’s contributions as specific advances in understanding 
the many themes he has addressed, and for their central role in 
advancing what he calls ‘the cosmopolitan turn in social and political 
theory’.  
I think we should understand ‘the cosmopolitan turn’ as referring 
both empirically to the growing number of theoretical publications that 
explicitly label themselves ‘cosmopolitan’, and normatively to the project 
of making social and political theory generally more attentive to global 
interconnection and less limited to the presumption of nation-states. 
Beck’s project is thus one of replacing ‘methodological nationalism’ with  
‘methodological cosmopolitanism’. Theories using the concept of 
cosmopolitanism are perhaps in its vanguard, but Beck wishes also to 
claim other work that tries to transcend the inscription of nationalist 
categories into much social science. And in his own work he has 
advanced both the theoretical project of understanding cosmopolitanism, 
and the project of integrating a more cosmopolitan perspective into social 
and political theory generally. Two valuable innovations in Beck’s work 
are specific foci of the current collection. 
First, Beck has recognized and worked to try to compensate for the 
embeddedness of cosmopolitan theory (and sociological research on 
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cosmopolitization) in the perspectives of the developed, Western core 
countries of the capitalist world system. Beck recognizes that his own 
earlier work, like most other work developing a theory of reflexive 
modernization (e.g. Beck, Giddens, and Lash 1994) is rooted in a largely 
implicit understanding of Western history. He rightly sees the need to 
reach beyond this, not only for an understanding of other histories but 
also for a different perspective on European history (see also 
Chakrabharty 2000). Beck faults this work also for relying on a notion of 
‘society’ in general that obscures from attention the differences among 
societies in their present structures, cultures, and historical 
trajectories.1 This collection is a partial response, emphasizing distinctive 
experiences of ‘modernization’ in one world region and using these to try 
to make the general theory more attentive to diverse patterns. We should 
be grateful. 
Second, during the last five years or so, Beck (with Edgar Grande, 
Natan Sznaider and other collaborators) has worked to resolve an 
ambiguity that is widespread in discussions of cosmopolitanism, 
including even in sophisticated theoretical and empirical works (and here 
too Beck self-critically recognizes that this includes some of his own 
1 It is true that much social and political theory has been written in ways that confuse 
the theory of one of many societies with the theory of society in general. Beck is 
disarmingly self-critical, listing himself along with many others guilty of this. But a 
caveat should be entered about Niklas Luhmann, who in his last work conceptualized a 
global ‘society of societies’ (Luhmann 1997). Though Luhmann is an influence on Beck, 
he is also a very different kind of theorist. Yet it would be constructive to consider the 
relationship between Luhmann’s conception of the encompassing whole of the society of 
societies and Beck’s account of the differentiation of varieties within second modernity. 
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earlier works). This ambiguity is reflected in the tendency to use the 
same terms to refer to (a) a normative account of what would make the 
world a better place, and (b) an empirical argument that the world is in 
fact changing. Here accounts of cosmopolitanism share much with 
accounts of ‘progress’ as they flourished in the nineteenth Century, and 
indeed with the ‘modernization theory’ of the middle-twentieth Century. 
The issue is not just the difference between an abstract ideal and very 
partial empirical achievement of that ideal. It is also that the actual 
changes observed in the empirical world may not ever issue in the full 
achievement of the ideal; they may become part of historical processes 
leading to other denouements.  
 
Are diverse histories just varieties of second modernity? 
How wide is the variation, how common the path? Beck and Grande 
begin by insisting that social theory needs to give up universalization in 
favor of greater attention to historical, geographic, and cultural specifics. 
I agree. For Beck and Grande and most participants in this special issue, 
this is compatible with speaking of varieties (in the plural) of second 
modernity (in the singular). While Han and Shim (2010) reject other 
attempts to conceptualize different trajectories as alternative or multiple 
modernities, Beck and Grande (2010) seem more inclined to incorporate 
the approaches of Eisenstadt, Therborn and others as more or less steps 
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in the same direction. They conceptualize second modernity in terms of 
an epochal break with the institutional structures developed to deal with 
first modernity (states, parties, unions, business enterprises, etc) while 
the core principles of modernity (mainly market economy) continue.   
But Beck, Grande and others in this collection also distinguish 
first modernity from second by several ‘process variables’: action logic, 
duration, and result. Each points to something meaningful, but each is 
problematic. (a) There is great variation in how much self-conscious 
intention is involved in historical transformations, including those 
summed up by the idea of modernization. But it is misleading to suggest 
‘that at least in the case of the Western forerunners of reflexive 
modernization this process takes place unintended’ (Beck and Grande 
2010: 9). From early in the history of capitalism, for example, there were 
debates about how much governments should regulate trade. One has 
only to think of the eighteenth century controversies over mercantilism 
and the important role of intellectual arguments and the rise of the field 
of economics in the nineteenth  century spread of free-trade ideology and 
practices – just as market fundamentalism or ‘neoliberalism’ flourished 
in the late twentieth century partly on the basis of a long campaign led 
by followers of Hayek and Friedman among others. Neither the building 
of market institutions nor the disassembly of regulatory institutions took 
place unintended in the West. It may be that East Asian countries 
developing both markets and regulatory regimes today have the benefit of 
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more history from which to learn; it is still the case that history’s lessons 
are filtered through ideology, argument, and self-interest.  There is also 
great variation in who exercises whatever choice circumstances allow. It 
is problematic to speak in an unqualified way of societies taking 
intentional action. Such language tends to equate the decisions of 
governments or governing elites with societal choices – replicating some 
of the rhetoric of nation=state otherwise held problematic. More 
generally, the capacity to make effective choices about strategies of 
development or responses to risk is distributed unevenly and through a 
variety of different organizations and power structures.  
More briefly, (b) we should also question the notion of ‘stretched’ vs 
‘compressed’ processes of reflexive modernization. There is no doubt that 
at different points from Japan’s Meiji restoration through the self-
strengthening movement of late-Imperial China and on through the last 
hundred years many in East Asian societies have felt pressed to ‘catch 
up’ to global economic leaders and/or the West. But it is not clear that 
one can speak of ‘stretched’ vs ‘compressed’ processes of modernization 
without some benchmark of ‘normal’ duration, and I don’t think any 
such plausibly exists. What is relevant is not the stretching or 
compression of some normal period of time, but the way in which felt 
 7 
pressures translate into different experiences, strategies, institutions, or 
outcomes.2  
Likewise, (c) projects of state-building, economic development, or 
democratization may succeed or fail. These are projects that may be 
evaluated in the agents’ own terms. But to say that modernization as 
such can fail requires clarification. Is it a project to be judged according 
to the particular aspirations of agents in every case (and what counts as 
a case – the history of a potential nation-state)? Or is it a more general 
process that distributes risks and challenges and differential resources 
for meeting them? If it is the latter, agents might fail in their efforts to 
manage risks or to build stronger institutions but it is hard to see why 
that should be called failed modernization (as distinct from, say, being 
crushed or crippled by the actions of others or disadvantaged by 
geography, demography, or natural resource endowments). We need to 
understand whether success or failure is a label placed on relative 
standing in an unequally structured world system or an evaluation of 
more or less autonomous projects in their own terms. The issue isn’t 
trivial or merely terminological. It is a basic question about the extent to 
2 Beck and Grande (drawing on other colleagues writing for this collection (Beck and 
Grand 2010; BJS 2010)) identify two patterns they see as distinctive to East Asian 
history: ‘the victim-constellation of late developing countries’ in which the challenges of 
Second Modernity come before the institutional resources of First Modernity have been 
consolidated and ‘compressed modernization’ in which the development of First 
Modernity and transition to Second are speeded up and almost simultaneous. Arguably 
these patterns that run through the last five hundred years (and perhaps earlier 
histories)? This formulation also sounds very much like accounts of ‘late modernizers’ – 
notably Germany and Japan – and their propensity for ethnic nationalism (Kohn 1944) 
or state led development (Gerschenkron 1962). 
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which the theory addresses action, impersonal historical processes, or 
teleology. 
Take the gloss offered by Beck and Grande (2010: 9) on the idea of 
failed modernization: ‘the establishment of institutions of First modernity 
(like the nation-state) or the transformation into Second modernity fails’. 
What is the unit that ‘fails’ to develop a nation-state? Is it a people, 
assumed already to exist as a nation that doesn’t succeed in gaining an 
autonomous state – say, Palestine? Is it a region brought under the 
governance of another state within which its people(s) are national 
minorities – say, Central Asia under the USSR? In each case, this seems 
less a matter of ‘failure’ than of external imposition.3 Chang (2010: 13) 
says that in East Asia ‘modernity initially happened as an international 
political incident’ – that is to say, East Asian countries were coerced to 
open themselves to Western imperialist forces, capitalist markets, and an 
‘alien civilization’. They broke away from their pasts to become modern in 
a way that meant Western. And even on ‘liberation’ from formal 
colonialism many of these Third World nations remained dominated. 
Or again, Second Modernity is defined by the incapacity of the 
institutions of First Modernity to handle new risks and the consequent 
effort to develop new institutions or approaches. But where the 
3 Relatedly, it is no doubt right that the West has produced risks with which the rest of 
the world must cope. It has been disturbingly proficient at externalizing dangers and 
damages. Consistent with Beck’s emphasis on risk, Beck and Grande speak only of 
dangers, but I think there are rather clearly damages and injuries that manifest 
themselves directly, not only probabilistically as risks. 
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incapacity of the older institutions is due partly to their destruction by 
neoliberal policies, should we judge this a successful transition to 
Second Modernity? Conversely, would effective reform of older 
institutions so that they provided better protection against risk 
constitute a ‘failure’ to make the transition to Second Modernity? This 
would imply that Norway has failed because its state institutions work 
better than those of, say, Greece.  
Or take this to an East Asian context. Aside from such paradoxes, 
this conceptualization makes it harder, not easier, to understand the 
various contending and sometimes contradictory projects by which 
Chinese people try to prosper, strengthen the country, and cope with 
challenges. It is meaningful and coherent to say that the self-
strengthening movement of the 1890s, the Republic Revolution of 1911, 
the May 4th Movement of 1919, the Communist Revolution of 1949, the 
Great Leap Forward, the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, Deng 
Xiaoping’s reforms, and the expansion of credit, markets, private 
enterprise, and cooperation with foreign capital from the early 1990s 
were all efforts to modernize. As conscious efforts they were reflexive. But 
the actors reflecting on China’s circumstances did not have entirely the 
same agendas. Is the project of modernity the lowest common 
denominator? Is it the encompassing whole? Is it to be judged by some 
external, objective or universal measures? Or is it a term that only 
derives meaning from competition with other countries or regions?  
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Part of the power of Beck’s overall theoretical and empirical 
contributions lies in an account of the crisis – and perhaps failure – of 
the European welfare state model. An achievement of the twentieth 
century and especially the post-WWII period, this involved the 
institutionalization of a variety of centrally organized responses to the 
contradictions of capitalist development.4 One might almost call it the 
attempt to make good on Hegel’s (1821) account of how the 
contradictions in civil society demand to be answered by a unifying, 
integrating, but also welfare-providing state. It was Bismark’s project in a 
very conservative and militarist version. It was a social democratic 
project in a much more egalitarian version achieved by collective 
struggles, centrally of trade unions and social movements. But it came 
unstuck in an era of global competition and new risks. I suspect Beck 
would not be adverse to recognizing that it had a ‘legitimation crisis’ 
(Habermas 1975) even before this, but he very helpfully points to the 
extent to which the travails of the welfare states have been produced or 
exacerbated by new kinds of prevailing risks, and especially risks not 
contained or manageable within nation-state borders. If this is the 
central, important, and powerful account Beck has offered, it has a 
nagging limit. This is the extent to which his theoretical work and his 
4 Is there something new about modernity threatening its own foundations? Is this 
specific to the globalization of capital and risks in second modernity, or has it been the 
case throughout the history of capitalism and the organization of political power 
through nation-states that modernity embodied contradictions that threatened its 
foundations? 
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attention to the rest of the world starts from this ‘problematique’. That is, 
he takes the welfare state as normal, and studies most everything else as 
a deviation from or crisis of that normal. We should admire Beck’s 
struggle to transcend this path, but also help him to go further. 
Beck’s intentions are sound. To some extent they are undercut by 
an approach that first questions a theorized historical sequence as 
limited to one case – Western Europe – then reinscribes other histories as 
variants of that same sequence:  
the first insight is that the sequence from Pre-modernity to First 
Modernity and Second Modernity is not universal, cannot be 
generalized. On the contrary, this sequence is a central feature of 
the particular European path to modernity’ (Beck and Grande 17, 
original italics) 
  
but then  
The question of how varieties of Second Modernity can be 
reconstructed receives a systematic answer here – in terms of 
different sequences, combinations and mixtures of Pre-modernity, 
First Modernity, Second and After-modernity’ (Beck and Grande 
2010: xx–xxx).  
 
As Maharaj (2010: 3) notes, this ‘leaves us in the air about whether all 
modernities are heading for the same thing, let alone chasing after the 
identical dream’. 
Beck and colleagues focus here on two ways of adding diversity to 
the empirical basis of social and political theory. They give accounts of 
East Asian countries that focus (1) on broad cultural or civilizational 
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patterns and (2) on relatively recent histories of pursuing rapid economic 
development. This is a start at appreciating diversity, not an attempt to 
be exhaustive.  
Social and political theory today relies heavily on tacit 
incorporation of Western historical patterns into seemingly universal 
categories. One problem is that theorists’ understanding of Western 
history itself is often highly stylized and reliant on a somewhat 
stereotyped historical synthesis – what the theorists learned as students 
– and not informed as much as it should be by new historical research. 
An analogous problem can undermine efforts to incorporate other 
civilizational histories into the empirical basis of theory. It is important 
for these to reflect serious historical research not simply tacit 
incorporation of canonical accounts such as those that inform secondary 
school teaching. This means recognizing tensions and contradictions in 
historical patterns, not relying on the kinds of national (or civilizational) 
histories that achieve synthesis by ironing out such tensions to produce 
stereotypical, often ideological self-understandings. Social theory needs 
history, thus, not only a diversity of cultural perspectives. 
The history that social theory needs is not simply a history of other 
places. It is a history of the complex processes by which different units of 
political power and economic differentiation form and fade, the way these 
sometimes overlap broad civilizational continuities and sometimes not, 
the way patterns of cultural integration sometimes match political 
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structures and sometimes not, and the kinds of communication that run 
along trade-routes and military frontiers. It is a history shaped by both 
geopolitics and culture.  
Beck and Grande rightly appreciate Paul Gilroy’s (1993) account in 
The Black Atlantic and the image of ships in motion as a metaphor for the 
study of dynamic connections rather than fixed or essentialized nations. 
Gilroy’s book was part of a trend towards histories of interconnections 
rather than discrete nations. Bodies of water were often emphasized 
instead of masses of land, and seen as connectors not always dividers. 
Lord Acton (1906) anticipated this in the second of his Lectures on 
Modern History, ‘The Portuguese were the first Europeans to understand 
that the ocean is not a limit, but the universal waterway that unites 
mankind’. Bailyn (2005) traces the idea of the Atlantic world and a 
specific Atlantic history back to Walter Lippman reflecting on the 
relations of America and Europe in the era of WWI. But through the 
middle of the twentieth century, thinking in terms of nation-states and 
civilizational areas occluded many of these connections. Fernand 
Braudel’s (1949) study of The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean 
World in the Age of Philip II was perhaps the most famous exploration of 
civilization to center on a sea – though as Bailyn points out it addressed 
disaggregation as much as integration. Braudel was a crucial influence 
on Immanuel Wallerstein (1974) in the development of sociology’s most 
important theory of global interconnections, capitalism and geopolitics. 
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But it was in the 1990s that the analysis of connections outside and 
across conventional regions began to take off. 
There has been growing recognition that it is not adequate to speak 
of Europe and Africa, Asia and Latin America. It is important also to 
speak of the Indian Ocean, the Atlantic, the Pacific – and also the links 
forged by coastal trade from places like Yemen across all of southern 
Asia and the Pacific or inland along the famous Silk Road. There have 
been periods when dominant powers were able to stabilize vast territories 
and periods when these empires broke up. There have ebbs and flows of 
trade across regions, civilizations, empires, and indeed seas. In all of this 
there are patterns of ethnic continuity (stressed by Smith 1986), and 
there are also peoples, languages, and cultures that disappear (stressed 
by Gellner 1983). But nation-states are manifestly only a dominant form 
of collective organization for one relatively brief period of world history 
(important as this modern era is to us). There are nation-states with a 
high level of continuity with pre-national organization (China) and those 
with much less (Sudan). But all nation-states, even those with the 
strongest ideologies of self-sufficiency, exist in contexts and webs of 
connections. For each nation-state the context is global – like the 
diffusion of the nation-state form of cultural-political organization itself; 
it is regional; it is a matter of immediate neighbours. For most the 
context includes the vast reach of the world’s major religions and the 
world’s major languages. And connections are forged both within such 
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contexts and across long-distances by particular paths of trade or 
migration, like that extending from Yemen to Indonesia.  
This isn’t the place to trace the importance of the many different 
kinds of contexts and connections within which units of political power, 
economic differentiation or cultural specificity are situated. The point, 
rather, is simply to recognize that the issue isn’t adequately posed by the 
question ‘what is the most appropriate unit of analysis’ (Beck and 
Grande 2010: 20)? There are necessarily many units of different kinds 
and many sorts of contexts and connections. Indeed, Beck and Grande 
may not disagree; elsewhere they cite postcolonial theorists approvingly 
for insisting not just on variation but also on interdependence. In any 
case, the account would be improved by clarity on this issue. Consider 
the contrast of the accounts here to the notion of a modern world system 
put forward by Wallerstein (1974). This suggests not only a general 
condition of capitalist globalization since the sixteenth century, but also 
its internal hierarchy and reliance on states for stabilization. If 
hegemonic powers stabilize the larger system, lesser states seek to 
stabilize local conditions of extraction, exploitation, and accumulation 
[TAKEN OUT AS THE PAPER WAS NOT INCLUDED IN ISSUE (GOOD 
JUDGMENT) – DO YOU WANT TO AMEND FOLLOWING?  DONE]World 
systems theory has been stronger on enduring structures than structural 
transformations (though the work of Giovanni Arrighi makes great 
strides; Arrighi and Silver 1999, Arrighi 2007). The work of Beck and 
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colleagues tells us less than world systems theory about structures of 
global organization. But it does points up pressures that destabilize and 
push for change (see esp. Chang 2010).  
In any case, the issue isn’t just units of analysis, it is the 
organization of collective action. Addressing risks affecting all humanity 
is crucial, but action is not likely to be organized simply on the scale of 
humanity as a whole, nor in some sort of ‘glocal’ connection of the largest 
and smallest units. It will involve the forging of solidarity of a range of 
scales from local communities to ethnic groups, cities, countries, social 
movements, and religions. As Beck and Grande (2010: 29) put it, there 
are multiple ‘we’ contexts. It will require formal organizations operating 
in a range of structural forms and scales, not as units of solidarity but as 
mechanisms for achieving specific effects. These will small organizations 
with large global missions like the International Criminal Court as well 
as much larger organizations like the World Bank or UN agencies. But 
they will also include smaller and less global organizations that still meet 
transnational needs: supplying condoms or mosquito nets, monitoring 
potential tsunamis, helping neighbouring countries manage trade. I 
stress this because cosmopolitan programmes often nurture the illusion 
that global issues will be addressed mainly by a ‘political subject called 
humanity’ (Beck and Grande 2010: 28). There is something attractive to 
the ideal that more and more people act from a concern for humanity as 
a whole. But to imagine any near-term shift to this as a primary 
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organization of political subjectivity is implausible, as is the imagining 
everyone and every organization sitting at the table and achieving 
balance (Beck and Grande 2010:  28, 31). 
The point is not just that nations still matter (Calhoun 2007). It is 
also that geopolitics still matters, organizational structures of many 
kinds on many scales matter, larger patterns of cultural affiliation, 
religion, or civilization still matter. And indeed just as nation-states still 
matter now, all of these also mattered throughout the era of nation-
states. Han and Shin (2010: 18) are right that  
we can no longer explain such global phenomena as 
unemployment, poverty new diseases, food contamination, the 
catastrophic fluctuation of the capital market, large-scale 
Hurricane and Tsnumai from a nation-centered perspective.  
 
But they are wrong to imply that we ever could. The critique of 
methodological nationalism must include the extent to which thinking 
only in terms of nation-states was misleading throughout the modern 
era, not just in a new period. 
Moreover, many large-scale structures are literally international, 
creatures of treaties and less formal cooperation among member 
countries. Beck and colleagues clearly recognize this even though they 
occasionally slip into talk of ‘replacing the national’ (Beck and Grande 
2010: 23–4) rather than complimenting national structures with many 
others. They also exaggerate how new the development of cosmopolitan 
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political structures is, writing that cosmopolitanism was active in the 
eighteenth and ‘ Centuries, but had disappeared by twentieth, 
reappearing only after collapse of the USSR. It is certainly true that 
nation-state political structures were ascendant between 1789 and 1989. 
However, we shouldn’t slight the League of Nations, the UN, the growth 
of global NGOs like CARE and OXFAM, the Non-Aligned Movement, 
international socialism or the 1960s Left. And we should ask whether 
there was ever a time when nation-state structures were either adequate 
to manage risks or quite so completely dominant as stereotype implies. 
Indeed, it is a Eurocentric illusion to think of the two centuries from the 
French Revolution to the fall of Soviet-style communism as simply an era 
of nation-states. It was also an era of empire (and imperialism after 
empire). Every major European nation-state was also the ‘homeland’ to 
an empire.  
Up through 1848, nationalism was itself the cosmopolitanism of 
the day – the springtime of peoples. National liberation movements had 
international supporters; the vision of a world of autonomous nations 
was precisely a vision of the world as a whole (sometimes echoing Kant’s 
hope for a federation, often including the anticipation of the self-
determination of colonized peoples). Not least the idea of nation invoked 
the solidarity of people living in different regions and towns, under 
different feudal authorities, governed in different ways; it said that all 
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were citizens of the larger country, and directly so, not indirectly through 
the mediation of chains of differentiated authority. 
But though more care for precision is important, the real point is 
that the genuinely global challenges to which Beck and colleagues rightly 
point call forth a wide range of responses and organizational structures. 
It is not clear that ‘those who play the national card will inevitably lose’ 
(). Even if it is true that in aggregate nationalist politics is in decline, and 
even if nationalism does not offer the basis for solving a variety of large 
problems like climate change, this does not mean that nationalist 
strategies may not yield advantages. I do not mean merely that the use of 
force to take advantage of minorities or neighbours can sadly sometimes 
pay off. I mean that nationalist protectionist policies can be effective 
components of overall economic development projects (Chang 2002).  
Moreover,  the declining power of the nation-state and growing 
transnational interconnections could lead to chaos and conflict instead of 
to a world of effective transnational governance – and if transnational 
governance grows, it might look more like empire than like ‘cosmopolitan 
democracy’. Or again, universal human rights may become a more 
urgent ideal in a globally interconnected world; the interconnections (not 
least through media) may lead more people to pay attention to rights and 
their violation; but neither of these guarantees that rights will be 
respected. Or still again, destruction of the environment may be 
proceeding on a global scale, creating shared risks that put all humanity 
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into a ‘community of fate’, but this does not guarantee that we will find a 
cosmopolitan solution – or any solution at all.   
 
Distinguishing the normative from the empirical 
Beck seeks mainly, he says, to develop ‘analytical–empirical 
cosmopolitanism’ as a product of ‘value-free’ social science. This will 
produce a description of the actual conditions of contemporary social life 
– which Beck sees mainly as a ‘world risk society’ in which people are 
materially interdependent but inescapably exposed to shared risks. 
These demand the creation of ‘institutionalized cosmopolitanism’ but in 
the short run they are axes of conflict: ecological interdependency crises, 
economic interdependency crises, and terrorist interdependency crises. 
Beck (2006: 24) seeks to ‘demarcate, though not to neglect, normative 
and political cosmopolitanism in a world that has become a danger to 
itself'.5  But of course cosmopolitan and for that matter modernity are 
widely used as normative and aspirational terms and it is hard to free 
accounts of cosmopolitization or modernization from implicit 
progressivist teleology. 
To clarify the relationship between normative aspirations and 
empirical transformations, Beck has introduced a distinction between 
5 Beck’s argument is presented, sometimes with shifting terminology, in about a dozen 
provocative and insightful though not always systematic books starting with his classic 
Risk Society (1992) and continuing unabated.  
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‘cosmopolitanism’ and ‘cosmopolitization’. Though I appreciate the effort 
and think Beck is on the right track, I think the distinction is awkward 
and doesn’t do the work needed. Part of the problem is simply that it is 
very difficult to read ‘cosmopolitization’ as not entailing progress along 
the path to ‘cosmopolitanism’. Indeed, the essays in this collection 
frequently fail to maintain the distinction. Yet that is what we need to do 
for the reconceptualization to succeed. And here while my appreciation 
continues – Beck addresses an important issue many cosmopolitan 
theorists have skirted – it also gives way to argument. As we see in the 
essays on East Asia in this collection, Beck’s account of ‘second 
modernity’ invites reproducing many unfortunate tendencies of earlier 
modernization theories, including thinking in terms of a single more or 
less necessary pattern of development (albeit with different ‘varieties’). 
Like Tolstoy who said that happy families are all alike but each unhappy 
family is unhappy in its own way, the authors here appear to think that 
there is a single happy cosmopolitan future made possible by reflexive 
modernization, though there are innumerable different risks of disaster 
that could waylay it. 
Like its predecessor ‘modernization’, cosmopolitanism seems to 
imply a linear increase either in scale or in depth. How many people or 
countries are cosmopolitan or modern; how cosmopolitan, or how 
modern has each become? In the case of modernization, this implied 
linear development elided the relationship between labeling a period of 
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European history and participating in an orientation to the past as an 
inheritance to be overcome. It turned European (and American) history 
into a developmental variable to be applied anywhere. In the case of 
cosmopolitization, the analogous framing connects an assertion of 
sociological trends (migration, transnational flows of money or media, 
etc) to an idea of ‘citizenship of the world’ that has been presented as a 
matter of ethical universalism (Nussbaum 1996, 2006; Appiah 2006), 
appreciation for diversity and the unfamiliar (Sennett 1970, 
1977;Appadurai 1997; Pollock 2000; Pollock et al, 2000), attention to 
events beyond the local (Merton 1949; Gouldner 1957–8), or simply 
sophisticated style (Calhoun 2003 I’ve entered a suggested entry in the 
biblio for this cite is it correct?).   
The echoes of modernization theory with its dangled goal of being 
truly modern are evident in the essays on East Asia in the present 
collection. They present important insights into the sense of promise and 
pressure that motivates many in East Asia and the felt need to ‘catch up’ 
to Western modernization that drives ‘compressed’ cosmopolitization and 
economic development. But some care is needed before reaching firm 
conclusions. For example, some of the ills Han and Shim (2010: 20) cite 
as driving twenty-first century reflexive modernization in East Asia are 
identical to those that drove the building of ‘high modern’ state 
institutions in the nineteenth century: ‘large-scale accidents, violent 
crimes, the contamination of foods and tap water, fraudulent 
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constructions’ were all prevalent in ‘ C Europe and America. These are 
indeed products of greed and a rush to make money; whether that rush 
is greater in the ‘compressed modernization’ of East Asia today than in 
Victorian London or the cities that grew explosively on the American 
frontier is an empirical question. If we used life-expectancy data as an 
indicator it is not immediately evidence that more fatal shortcuts are 
being taken in contemporary East Asia (but of course more evidence and 
more analysis would be needed to be certain).  
International competition is a feature of the whole modern era (say, 
the last 500 years). It has driven the development of nation-state 
structures themselves and also the use of those structures to attempt to 
bolster economic development. As Ha-Joon Chang (2002) emphasizes, 
the free-trade ideology of neoliberals and the ‘Washington consensus’ of 
the late twentieth century represented an attempt to deny contemporary 
developing countries the use of protectionist and other mechanisms on 
which European and American powers themselves relied in becoming 
rich. The pressure to catch-up was felt intensely by the British in relation 
to the Dutch, the Americans and Germans in relation to the British, and 
so forth. It propelled not only state interventions but also reluctance to 
regulate industries that caused harm whether by pollution, or faulty 
products, or fraudulent business practices – and manifestly this sort of 
pressure hasn’t disappeared from US or European contexts. This doesn’t 
mean that there aren’t intense pressures on East Asian countries; there 
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are. But it is important to sort out what has to do with systemic 
pressures of capitalist production, trade and accumulation and what 
with anxieties shaped by national ambitions, the reinforcing belief in 
previous glory, or the projects of specific leaders. ‘We must catch up’ can 
be an ideological proposition justifying a variety of policies, inequalities, 
and impunities for abuse.  
Kyung-Sup Chang analyses this pressure as part of the 
distinctively ‘compressed modernity’ of East Asia. Chang (2010: 6) sees 
compressed modernity as ‘a rather universal feature of contemporary 
national societies’ but acute in Korea and East Asia generally. He cites 
David Harvey’s (1990 corrected to match date of title in biblio) account of 
account of time–space condensation as a characteristic of capitalism, 
and specifically of attempts to overcome accumulation crises. Harvey 
extended this analysis of capitalism into an analysis of postmodern 
cultural production and social change and Chang sees similar factors at 
work in postcolonial contexts and in Asia more generally. This seems 
right, but we should be clear that a ‘dynamic coexistence of mutually 
disparate historical and social elements’ (Chang 2010: 2) is not limited to 
‘second modernity’. Think of the articulation of different modes of 
production during Western Europe’s transition to industrial capitalism.  
Capitalism has recurrently brought reckless bursts of investment 
far exceeding rational expectations of return (Lamoreaux and Sokoloff 
2007). These may have ‘irrationally’ financed great technological 
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innovations. Certainly they led to the coexistence of production processes 
and capital accumulation processes rooted in different historical periods 
and social organizations. To analyse such phenomena it is important to 
be more specific about capitalism – not just modernization – and about 
different dimensions of capitalism. Beck and Grande (2010: 2) describe 
the current consolidation of global economic power as ‘the global victory 
of industrial capitalism’. Yet it may actually be more consistent with the 
accounts of diverse global conditions to recognize the co-existence of 
industrial and financial capitalism. Since the 1970s, profits flowed 
increasingly in the financial sector; much innovation centered on the 
production of new financial instruments. This was not really the coming 
of post-industrial society since in some parts of the world 
industrialization was rapidly proceeding. None the less, the centrality of 
finance capital has played a key role in shaping booms, bubbles, and the 
intensification of globalization. It is a crucial condition of both the 
opportunities some East Asian societies are seizing and the sense of 
speed-up and pressure they experience.  
Beck (are you referring back to Beck 2006 or to both Beck and 
Grande here?) is right to recognize the difference between an abstract 
normative orientation and an empirical reality – and indeed right to ask 
what institutions might help to bring order and improvement to that 
empirical reality. But his terminology is confusing. Beck seeks to make 
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several points almost at once and proliferates concepts at a rapid rate. I 
take this to be his argument, in brief outline: 
(1) An earlier phase of modernity was organized primarily in terms of 
national states, which sought to manage many of the risks people 
faced, although markets and other phenomena did cross state 
boundaries.  
(2) Modern social and political theory grew during this growing 
dominance of nation-states in world affairs and internalized the 
nation-state as the tacit model for societyitself – influenced both by 
the actual power of nation-states and by the widespread aspiration 
to organize the world on the basis of nation-states.  
(3) An earlier sort of philosophical cosmopolitanism was also 
developed in this context, calling on people ethically to transcend 
narrow nationalist views, though the sociological conditions of 
their lives did not make adhering to this ethics a felt necessity for 
most. 
(4) Actually existing and accelerating trends have intensified 
transnational connections and flows bringing about a new phase of 
modernity in which there is ‘a growing unreality of the world of 
nation-states’ (Beck 2006: 21). This is a matter not only of positive 
connections but also of new shared risks such as environmental 
disaster. 
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(5) This ‘second modernity’ is ‘reflexive’ in several senses including (a) 
growing efforts to try to guide it, and (b) greater consciousness of 
the larger patterns on the part of ordinary people – who for 
example not only mix more across lines of cultural difference but 
are consciously aware of this and often explicitly affirm the virtues 
of such mixing, and who recognize the existence of a global 
community of fate. 
(6) Material globalization (#4 above) subjects people to a ‘deformed 
cosmopolitanism’ that is ‘passively and unwillingly suffered’. This 
‘cosmopolitization’ is to be the object of objective scientific study 
which requires the social sciences to overcome ‘methodological 
nationalism’ (that is, the reliance on nation-states as the normal 
units for all social science research). 
(7) Because people are increasingly aware of their integration into a 
transnational community of fate (#5 above) they are may choose to 
counter global threats by ‘partaking in the great human 
experiment in civilization’ which is actively and consciously trying 
to create new cosmopolitan institutions. Beck is not altogether 
explicit about this, but he seems to hold that this is not only good 
but also increasingly likely and perhaps even necessary in the 
sense that it is the only outcome that allows civilization to 
continue. 
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Beck has multiple purposes in developing this argument. 
(a) He wants to urge social scientists to overcome their 
‘methodological nationalism’ in order to do better empirical 
research on global phenomena. 
(b) He wants to distinguish between mere moral norms and 
sociological attention to empirical reality in order to argue for 
cosmopolitanism on the grounds of empirical and practical 
necessity, free from the implication of arguing for a pure ought (as 
‘philosophical cosmopolitans’ might be accused of doing). 
(c) He wants to assert that actual empirical changes make adherence 
to cosmopolitan moral norms more likely, that while in the ‘first 
modernity’ cosmopolitan norms were merely intellectual and 
nationalism captured people’s hearts, in the ‘second modernity’ 
this is reversed. (Beck 2006: 19)  
(d) He wants the cosmopolitanism he supports to be ‘critical’ in 
defending only the versions that support social justice and not the 
‘banal’ or ‘deformed’ versions rampant in the contemporary world. 
 The confusion in Beck’s usage comes largely from using the same 
term or nearly the same term to refer to (a) an abstract aspiration, (b) an 
ostensible existing condition, (c) a possible future trend, and (d) a 
political or even existential imperative. But though Beck cites Kant as an 
exemplar of the abstract aspiration he offers little evidence that actually 
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existing cosmopolitization is producing anything like the just 
universalism proposed by Kant or other philosophical cosmopolitans. He 
calls actually existing conditions ‘deformed cosmopolitanism’ which 
implies that they are simply misshapen versions of what Kant and others 
sought: 
There can be no doubt that a cosmopolitanism that is passively 
and unwillingly suffered is a deformed cosmopolitanism. The fact 
that really existing cosmopolitanism is not achieved through 
struggle, that it is not chosen, that it does not come into the world 
as progress with the reflected moral authority of the 
Enlightenment, but as something deformed and profane, cloaked 
in the anonymity of a side effect – this is an essential founding 
insight of cosmopolitan realism in the social sciences. (Beck 2006: 
20–1). 
 
Of course the cosmopolitanism Kant sought was not merely the 
interconnection of different populations and different parts of the world. 
But though Beck sharply distinguishes ‘philosophical’ from ‘social 
science’ cosmopolitanism, he inexitricably links them. By using the same 
word – qualified by ‘deformed’ – Beck suggests that the empirical reality 
is a version of the normative ideal. Is it?  
 Put bluntly, are the global AIDS crisis, massive environmental 
degradation, increasing concentration of capital, human trafficking, the 
drug trade, the Internet and Interpol simply deformed versions of the 
cosmopolitanism that Kant sought? A case can be made that the 
proliferation of human rights treaties, the International Criminal Court, 
and efforts to provide humanitarian relief represent steps in the direction 
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of the Kantian ideal (perhaps with some deformations). A case could be 
made that European Unification is a step in that direction (a step that 
seems less secure today than it did a decade ago). But to equate 
internationalization and globalization in general with ‘cosmopolitization’ 
is at best confusing. It attaches an ideal of universal justice to any reality 
that is organized in large-scale transnational terms. 
 It is indeed the case that the actual conditions of globalization 
create innumerable connections across lines of cultural difference, 
challenge attempts to maintain insularity at national and other levels, 
and make the world into a community of fate. In the contemporary world 
more and more people are compelled to navigate transnational spaces – 
markets, media, migration flows (whether as migrants or coming into 
contact with immigrants) – in the course of their daily lives. And 
experiences of transnational connection do often lead to a growing 
consciousness of that larger world. This would appear to be what Beck 
and his associates mean by ‘cosmopolitization’. This sometimes leads to 
global problem-solving but it would be a challenge – one so far not met – 
to show a linear correlation. The same global competition and awareness 
also produces anxiety and reliance on national and other non-global 
institutions for defense. 
 Beck’s view is perhaps really more Hegelian than Kantian: 
‘Realistic cosmopolitanism should not be understood and developed in 
opposition to universalism, relativism, nationalism, and ethnicism, but 
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as their summation or synthesis’ (2006: 57). Cosmopolitanism is not 
mere universalism, which is not only too abstractly normative but too 
one-dimensional.  
Cosmopolitanization is a non-linear, dialectical process in which 
the universal and the particular, the similar and the dissimilar, the 
global and the local are to be conceived, not as cultural polarities, 
but as interconnected and reciprocally interpenetrating principles. 
(Beck 2006: 73) 
 
 ‘Global cosmopolis’ thus will subsume and recognize national and other 
differences (see also Held 1995; Levy 2010). And what is overcome is not 
only territorially organized cultural homogeneity but class and other 
oppositions. ‘Understood in this way, the normatively oriented 
cosmopolitan account modulates all dualisms that have divided and 
separated human beings’ (Beck 2006: 141). This appears to suggest not 
the strong separation of the normative account but its leading role in the 
empirical trend. 
 Beck seeks ways to achieve unity but without reproducing either 
the divisiveness or the rigidities of nation states. This is an important 
project. I share the sense of need. But I am concerned that the reality of 
global connections is taken to underwrite a much more confident 
expectation of cosmopolitanism than is warranted, and that a variety of 
normative ideals inform that expectation – including that 
cosmopolitanism will be democratic rather than imperial.  
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Beck rightly stresses the extent to which human beings live in 
communities of fate – at a planetary scale when considering 
environmental disasters but also at intermediate scales like Europe 
(which he sees as integrating not so much because of past common 
heritage as in order to respond to global pressures and issues).  
The situation of Europe is special in spite of everything. Nowhere 
in the world are transnationalization and cosmopolitanization so 
far advanced. We must speak in terms of an ‘institutionalized 
cosmopolitanism’ as exhibited in the EU, for example, by the 
European Council, European law (the European Court), the single 
currency of the ‘Euro’ (which has replaced the sacrosanct national 
currencies), European frontiers (which have taken precedence over 
national frontiers, the symbols of sovereignty), and so forth. (Beck 
2006: 114; see also Beck and Grande 2007).  
 
Here again, I think Beck calls our attention to something important and 
rightly urges us to be critical of the ‘methodological nationalism’ built 
into the very categories and analytic habits of social science. But at the 
same time, we need to recognize that the history of European integration 
is relatively brief and be cautious about assuming that it will proceed 
without reversals or successful resistance. And we need to ask whether 
the transnational integration of Europe is necessarily part of a linear 
process of global integration – cosmopolitization – or a regional re-
organization resistant to some aspects of global integration (say, 
migration) and seeking to manage others (say, market competition) for 
regional benefit. Use of the terms cosmopolitan or cosmopolitization to 
name processes taking place on scales much less than global invites 
misunderstanding and also neglect of some empirical possibilities.  
 We might ask similar questions about accounts of individualization 
important to several articles in this collection. The distinction of 
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individualism from indvidualization is analogous to that between 
cosmopolitanism and cosmopolitization, an incomplete attempt to 
disentange the empirical from the normative. The notion of individuals 
finding it necessary to ‘design their biographies’ (Beck and Beck-
Gernsheim 2001 I have inserted a suggested entry for this in the biblio – 
please checkCORRECT) is informative. So is notion of individualization 
under compulson – what we might call the forced privatization of risk 
(Calhoun 2006 ditto or perhaps you are referring to Calhoun 2007? –NO; 
I’VE PUT THE CORRECT REFERENCE IN THE LIST).  
Is either altogether new? Beck and Grande (2010: 8) present them 
as the result of an epochal break between first and second modernities. 
But surely individualization is characteristic of modernity in general. 
Migrants from villages to cities during the industrial revolution surely 
experience disembedding and re-embedding. The rise of the novel in 
Western Europe is partly a corollary to a new culture of individual 
biographies. How should we understand the American movement West 
after the Civil War if not as involving individualization under compulsion. 
The core distinction between achieved and ascribed statuses – design 
and production of one’s own biography vs acceptance of one’s place in an 
established order – is wider still (Linton 1936). There is historical 
variation, to be sure, but also cross-cultural, class, and gender variation.  
Several of the essays here describe individualization in 
contemporary and recent East Asia. The transformations are enormous. 
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Changes in gender roles, relations, and aspirations are dramatic as 
Chang and Song show in their useful presentation of a rich trove of data 
on Korean women. Suzuki et al (2010: 3) show a burgeoning 
individualization in to Japan, though two decades later they think than 
in the West – partly perhaps because companies rather than national 
welfare states managed much risk and families continued to be effective 
risk managers longer. Yan (2010) traces comparably profound 
individualization process in the communist and especially the post-
communist era in China. Yet the limited temporal scope makes it too 
easy to imagine that before China was simply collective, simply 
traditional. What of 1890s, we might ask, or of 1919?  
The cultural ferment of these earlier periods was marked by both 
individualism – like that of the Romantic poet Xu Zhimo and 
individualization – like the disembedding of thousands of rural villagers 
to move into rapidly growing cities like Shanghai, possibly to be re-
embedded in quasi-traditional organizations like clan societies but also 
perhaps in organized crime or service to colonial or merchant elites. It is 
true as Yan says that some Chinese individualism could be traced to 
Enlightenment Europe and as my mention of Xu Zhimo suggests, more 
than a little to European Romantics. The gender dimensions were 
important here too, with the anti-footbinding campaign, protest against 
patriarchy and arranged marriages, a wave of girls named Nora after 
from Ibsen’s A Doll’s House. And individualism and individualization 
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came together in the initially small numbers of Chinese women able to 
make their own careers – like Lin Huiyin, perhaps China’s first female 
architect and also the great love of Xu Zhimo’s life (though making the 
story stereotypically Romantic after he divorced his wife for her she 
married someone else, in fact the son of Xu’s great teacher Liang Qichao.  
Yan (2010: 16) describes three processes he sees as no longer 
important in Western Europe but now occurring in other parts of the 
world:  
(1) The legitimation of individual desires and intensification of 
individual competition by way of the triumph of market economy 
and global consumerism; (2) The surge of social movements 
promoting individual rights and freedom by means of the global 
discourse of and political changes toward democracy; (3) The 
shifting balance among three major components of a given society 
– the individual, social groups, and modern institutions/the state-
due to the rise of the individual in social life. 
 
 Yan is right that ‘the individual has become an increasingly 
important social category in previously collective-oriented societies’ but it 
would be a mistake to think this was all a new process. Perhaps it is 
better to suggest that modernization was reflexive from the outset. 
Still, is ‘individualization’ simply a linear trend of reflexive 
modernization, or a recurrent result of some patterns of social change? 
For example, the late Roman Empire arguably brought strong examples 
of the four basic features Beck and team identify with individualization: 
(1) detraditionalisation; (2) institutionalized disembedding and re-
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embedding of the individual; (3) compulsory pursuit for a ‘life of one’s 
own’ and lack of genuine individuality; (4) the internalization of risks’ 
(Beck and Grande 2010:13; see also Yan 2010). Isn’t this arguably part 
of the background to the rise of Christianity among Jews and others in 
the merchant cities of the Empire; among ‘seekers’ like St. Augustine 
who also explored Stoic philosophy and Manichaeism; and among the 
many who struggled to cope first with the disruptions of erratic emperors 
– fairly frequent, starting with Caligula and Nero – and then eventually 
with the Barbarian invasions?  Or again, wasn’t this variable in play as 
imperial China shifted between periods of increasingly commercial 
organization accompanied by social ‘liberalization’ and an emphasis on 
individual ethics – junxian – and more military, centralized, and 
hierarchical organization – fengjian – (see discussion in Schrecker1995; 
Duara 1995)? In fact, exploring any of these comparisons in much detail 
would probably require breaking the compound concept into several 
more discrete variables and exploring the extent to which they varied 
together. The very project of disassociating the concept from the 
specifically modern Western history that gave rise to it would seem to call 
for an examination of the extent to which the bundling together of 
different dimensions was or is essential or contingent. And this speaks to 
the enumeration of a long list of different ‘individualizations’ by Chang 
and Song (2010): reconstructive, nomadist, demographic and so forth. 
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The next step of sociological exploration will require going behind the 
labels to analyse the ways different variables interact. 
This is not to say that there is nothing new – in scale and perhaps 
even in quality. But to see what is new we need more precision and the 
situation of sociological accounts in stronger historical contexts. Han and 
Shim (2010: 3) suggest that ‘global risks release individuals from 
dependency on modern collective welfare system and push them to move 
elsewhere’. They make the good point that ‘release’ is often the ‘push’ of 
neoliberal termination of institutional support, not the ‘pull’ of ideals or 
aspirations. We need to distinguish, though, between global competition 
putting pressure on collective systems (say as competition to provide low-
cost labor leads East Asian countries and many others to minimize 
investment in safer working conditions) and global risks to which people 
and institutions respond (like environmental disaster). Han and Shim 
(2010: 14ff) draw on survey data to show the coexistence of traditional, 
modern, and post-modern. The survey seems heavily influenced by 
factors specific to its immediate context. None the less the larger point 
stands: ways of living and thinking labeled traditional, modern, and 
postmodern coexist. But maybe this is less a matter distinctive to East 
Asia than a problem with categories. As Maharaj (2010) says, ‘tradition’ 
may have a bigger role in the most modern societies than ‘traditional’ 
dichotomies suggest. As Lyotard  (1979) tried to suggest after his famous 
book on the Postmodern Condition was read as an account of historical 
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change, the postmodern was there all along. Or as Latour (1993) puts it, 
‘we have never been modern’. Put another way, invocation of the 
categories traditional, modern, and postmodern as though they 
demarcated historical periods is inherently problematic. 
More generally, it isn’t really viable to speak of simultaneous and 
interdependent phenomena as though they are separated by a ‘gulf of 
centuries’ (Beck and Grande 2010: 2)? This use of evolutionary or 
pseudo-historical language to speak of contemporaneous phenomena 
cannot avoid implying a unilinear pattern of development (Faubion 
2002). The simultaneous coexistence of old phenomena – say peasant 
agriculture with relatively primitive techniques – with newer ones – say 
computers or nuclear weapons – is not well described as a matter of two 
different time periods. It is a feature of one time period that establishes 
connections between these; the articulation of different modes of 
production, for example, is a feature of a socio-economic system in which 
there are factors limiting change in some areas and channeling benefits 
to some people rather than others. Or to take an example from 
contemporary politics, Afghanistan is not in the middle ages. If we 
wonder why Afghan social life is organized partly in ways that remind us 
(or at least members of a previous American political administration) of 
the middle ages the answer has to be given by a causal analysis (whether 
of geopolitics or the drug trade or Islam or patriarchy) and complemented 
by recognition of both the many ‘reflexively modern’ Afghans who have 
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struggled to remark their society and the many ways in which it is 
nothing like medieval Europe. 
 
Conclusion 
There is much more to the contributions offered here: Levy’s account of 
the globalization of human rights norms, for example, or Chang’s 
account of how neoliberalism exacerbates imbalances between economic 
and non-economic concerns. I don’t pretend to have even touched on all. 
I hope I have been able to bring out some concerns about the underlying 
theory. I raise the concerns not in order to undermine the project, with 
which I am broadly in sympathy, but to push it to greater precision and 
rigor. I also want to urge greater consideration of history in efforts to 
diagnose the present. 
 But let me close on a small but perhaps not insignificant point. It 
seems to me significant that all the main empirical essays in this special 
issue address specific nation-states. This does not prevent them from 
being informative. They point out ways in which national histories are 
shaped by international contexts, global challenges that states find it 
hard to confront. The different national cases bring important 
counterparts to the usual European histories informing accounts of 
modernization. But if we seek a more cosmopolitan sociology it will need 
to include a variety of accounts focused on other analytic objects. 
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However, the very prominence of nation-states in these accounts may 
also suggest the extent to which they still matter, critiques of 
methodological nationalism notwithstanding.   
 
(Date accepted:  June 2010) 
 
Bibliography 
Acton, Lord (John Emerich Edward Dahlberg) 1906 Lectures on Modern 
History, in the Online Library of Liberty at 
http://oll.libertyfund.org/?option=com_staticxt&staticfile=show.php%3Ftitle=2
09&chapter=41614&layout=html&Itemid=27 
Appiah, Anthony 2006 Cosmopolitanism (New York: Norton). 
Appadurai, Arjun 1997 Modernity at Large (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press). 
Arrighi, Giovanni 2007 Adam Smith in Beijing. London: Verso. 
Arrighi, Giovanni and Silver, Beverly 1999 Chaos and Governance in the 
Modern World System (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
Bailyn, Bernard 2005 Atlantic History: Concept and Contours, (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press.  
Beck, Ulrich 1992 The Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity. Newbury Park, 
Calif.:  Sage Publications. 
Beck, Ulrich 2006 Cosmopolitan Vision (Cambridge: Polity). 
 41 
Beck, Ulrich and Beck-Gernsheim, Elisabeth  2001 Individualization: 
Institutionalised individualism and its Social and Political Consequences, 
London: Sage. 
Beck, Ulrich, Giddens, Anthony,  and Lash, Scott 1994 Reflexive 
Modernization: Politics, Tradition and  Aesthetics in the Modern Social Order, 
Stanford, Cal.: Stanford University Press. 
Beck, Ulrich  and Grande,  Edgar 2007 Cosmopolitan Europe. Cambridge: 
Polity. 
Beck, Ulrich and Grande, Edgar 2010 ‘Varieties of Second Modernity: Extra-
European and European Experiences  and Perspectives’, British Journal of 
Sociology 61(3): xxx–xxx. 
British Journal of Sociology 2010 Special Issue on: Varieties of Second 
Modernity, British Journal of Sociology 61(3): xxx–xxx. 
Braudel, Fernand 1949 The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the 
Age of Philip II  (Berkeley: University of California Press, this ed. 1996). 
Calhoun, Craig  2003 Sociology: Journey into Society, Prentice Hall . 
Calhoun, Craig 2006 “The Privatization of Risk,” Public Culture, vol. 18 #2, pp. 257-63. 
Calhoun, Craig 2007 Nations Matter: Culture, History, and the Cosmopolitan 
Dream (Oxford: Blackwell). 
Chakrabharty, Dipesh 2000 Provincializing Europe. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press. 
Chang, Ha-Joon 2002 Kicking Away the Ladder: Development Strategy in 
Historical Perspective. London: Anthem Press.  
 42 
Chang Kyung-Sup 2010 ‘The Second Modern Condition?: Compressed 
Modernity as Internalized Reflexive Cosmopolitanism’, British Journal of 
Sociology 61(3): xxx–xxx. 
Chang Kyung–Sup and Song Min-Young 2010 ‘The Stranded Individualizer 
Under Compressed Modernity: South Korean Women in Individualization 
Without Individualism’,  British Journal of Sociology 61(3): xxx–xxx. 
Duara, Prasenjit 1995 Rescuing History from the Nation: Questioning Narratives 
of Modern China , Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Faubion, James D. 2002 Time and the Other. New York: Columbia University 
Press.  
Gellner, Ernest  1983  Nations and Nationalism,  Oxford:  Blackwell.  
Gerschenkron, Aleander 1962 Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective: A 
Book of Essays (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press). 
Gilroy, Paul 1993 The Black Atlantic, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press. 
Gouldner, Alvin 1957–8 ‘Cosmopolitans and Locals: Toward an Analysis of 
Latent Social Roles’ , Administrative Science Quarterly, Part I v. 2 (1957): 281–
306; Part II v. 2 (1958): 444–80.  
Habermas,  Jurgen  1975 Legitimation Crisis, (translated byThomas McCarthy). Boston: Beacon Press. 
Han, Sang-Jin  and Shim, Young-Hee 2010 ‘Redefining Second Modernity for East-Asia: A Critical Assessment’, British Journal of Sociology 61(3): xxx–xxx.Harvey, 
David 1990 The Condition of Postmodernity (Oxford: Blackwell). 
 43 
Hegel, G. W. F. 1821 Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, translated with Notes by T. M. Knox, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1952. 
Held, David 1995 Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to 
Cosmopolitan Governance, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 
Kohn, Hans 1944 The Idea of Nationalism, New Brunswick, NA: Transaction, 
this. Edition 2005. 
Lamoreaux, Naomi and Sokoloff, Kenneth 2007 Financing Innovation in the 
United States: 1870 to the Present (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press). 
Latour, Bruno 1993  We Have Never Been Modern, Cambridge Mass:  Harvard University Press.Levy, Daniel 2010 ‘Recursive Cosmopolitization: Argentina and the Global Human Rights Regime’, British Journal of Sociology 61(3): xxx–xxx. 
Linton, Ralph 1936  The Study of Man. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts. 
Luhmann, Niklas 1997 1997: Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft, Frankfurt: 
Suhrkamp. 
Lyotard, Jean-Francois 1979 The Postmodern Condition, Manchester 
Universiy Press. 
Maharaj, Sarat 2010 ‘”Small Change of the Universal”: Beyond Modernity’, 
British Journal of Sociology 61(3): xxx–xxx. 
Merton, Robert K. 1949 ‘Patterns of Influence: Local and Cosmopolitan 
Influentials’ in Social Theory and Social Structure, Glencoe, IL: Free Press 
(revised edition 1968).  
 44 
Nussbaum, Martha 1996 For Love of Country, Boston: Beacon.Nussbaum, 
Martha  2006 Frontiers of justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership, 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Pollock, Sheldon 2000 ‘Cosmopolitan and Vernacular in History,’ Public 
Culture 12(3) 591–626 
Pollock, Sheldon and Bhabha, Homi,  Breckenridge, Carol and 
Chakrabharty, Dipesh  ‘Cosmopolitanisms,’ Public Culture 12( 3):  577–89. 
Schrecker, John  1995  The Chinese Revolution in Historical Perspective.  New York:  Praeger. 
Sennett, Richard 1970 The Uses of Disorder, New York: Norton. 
Sennett, Richard  1977The Fall of Public Man, (New York: Norton. 
Smith, Anthony 1986  The Ethnic Origins of Nations.  Oxford:  Blackwell. 
Suzuki, Munenori, Ito, Midori, Ishida, Mitsunori, Nibei, Norihiro, and 
Maruyama, Masao (2010) ‘Individualizing Japan: Searching for its Origin in 
First Modernity’, British Journal of Sociology 61(3): xxx–xxx. 
Wallerstein, Immanuel 1974 The Modern World System (New York: Academic 
Press). 
Yan, Yunxiang 2010 ‘The Chinese Path to Individualization’, British Journal of 
Sociology 61(3): xxx–xxx. 
 45 
